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often it costs more money to excavate the land and set up the forms for
the foundation than to pour it.
In Illinois the precise issue raised by the present case had not previously
been before the courts. However, in earlier cases the courts had applied
equitable estoppel where an owner, in reliance upon affirmative acts of
the city, had made expensive improvements or had otherwise relied upon
such acts to his detriment."-' In the present case, the defendant had relied
upon his building permit and caused the building site to be rough graded,
excavations for foundations and footings dug and pumped dry, under-
ground sewer, drainage, water, and gas lines installed, and form work
for column and line wall footings and foundations installed. The defend-
ant had incurred liabilities upon the construction contracts amounting to
approximately $600,000.00. Most of the work had been done upon con-
tracts entered into before the permit was even issued. However, the court
made no distinction between the work done upon contracts entered into
before and upon those entered into after the permit was issued. The Illi-
nois Court followed the more equitable rule of the Glissmann and Crow
cases.
The result obtained in the present case would seem to be the more rea-
sonable and equitable one in a society where zoning regulations are so
important. It protects a person when he should be protected, namely,
where he has relied upon existent zoning ordinances in undertaking con-
struction contracts and work upon his premises. In states strictly follow-
ing the rule of the Brett case that zoning laws are not contracts by the
government and may be amended unless a great deal of work has been
done, the property owner will be forever waiting for subsequent amend-
ments before undertaking construction. Even after all the wasteful wait-
ing, an amendment may still be passed affecting the property before
construction is "far enough along" so as to give the owner a vested right.
This will result in much unfairness and the purposes of the zoning ordi-
nances will be defeated because people will be less inclined to rely upon
them in fear of subsequent amendments.
PROPERTY-PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
PROOF OF PAROL GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS
Plaintiff was a nurse who, in the course of her employment, frequently
visited Emily Collinson, aged sixty-nine and in ill health. When Emily
Collinson's health took a turn for the worse, the plaintiff arranged to ad-
mit her to a hospital. During the ride to the hospital, Emily Collinson
said to the alleged donee, "Here is a box, I am giving it to you, and if I
die, it is yours. I don't want anyone else to have it." Emily Collinson died
12 Hurt v. Hejhal, 259 IlL. App. 221 (1930); The People v. Thompson, 209 Il.
App. 570 (1918).
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of her aiiments and the plaintiff now asserts a right to the contents of the
box containing over eleven thousand dollars in cash, as against the
executor of the estate, claiming a valid gift causa mortis. The Supreme
Court of Indiana, in an evenly divided decision, held that it was contrary
to public policy to permit an alleged gift causa mortis to be proved on
the sole uncorroborated testimony of the alleged donee. In the Matter of
the Estate of Collinson, 108 N.E. 2d 700 (Ind., 1952).
This decision throws an interesting light on one of the areas of conflict
that exist in the field of proof necessary to establish the elements essential
to a valid gift causa mortis.
The elements necessary to establish a parol gift causa mortis, at com-
mon law, have long been recognized to include three things, namely:
1. it must be made with a view to the donor's death; 2. the donor must
die of that ailment or peril; 3. there must be a delivery, actual or con-
structive, to the donee, who accepts, or to a third person for the donee,
with title to vest in the donee conditionally upon the death of the donor.'
There has, however, been a conflict as to the degree of proof necessary.
The Collinson case illustrates the difficulty in deciding the following
propositions:
1. Whether possession is prima facie proof of delivery,2 or not.3
2. Whether delivery is prima facie proof of a parol gift causa mortis,4
or not.5
3. Whether the elements of a parol gift causa mortis must be proven
beyond all doubt,6 or beyond reasonable doubt,7 or merely by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence."
4. Whether the alleged donee may testify,9 and if such testimony be
1Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321, 24 N.E. 246 (1890); Gymes v. Hone, 49 N.Y. 17
(1872).
2 Stigletts v. McDonald, 135 Fla. 385, 186 So. 233 (1938); McKeon v. Van Slyck,
223 N.Y. 392, 119 N.E. 851 (1918); Cutler v. Lindstrom, 320 111. App. 360, 51 N.E.
2d 206 (1943); cf. In Re Ewing's Estate, 2 N.E. 2d 591 (111. App., 1936).
3Hecht v. Shaffer, 15 Wyo. 34, 85 Pac. 1056 (1906); cf. Salmon v. McCrary, 71
Ga. App. 262, 30 S.E. 2d 444 (1944).
4 Bedell v. Carll, 127 N.Y. 74, 33 N.Y. 581 (App. Div., 1865); Mechem, Delivery
in Gifts of Chattels, 21 111. L. Rev. 341 (1926).
5 Myers v. Tschiffely, 73 F. 2d 657 (App. D.C., 1934); Kenney v. The Public
Administrator, 2 Bradf. 319 (N.Y., 1853).
6 Citizens' Say. Bank v. Mitchell, 18 R.I. 739, 30 At. 626 (1894).
7Stewart v. Stokes, 177 Mo. App. 390, 164 S.W. 156 (1914); Foley v. Harrison,
233 Mo. 460, 136 S.W. 354 (1911).
8 In re Williams Estate, 278 N.Y. 538, 16 N.E. 2d 94 (1938); Foley v. Coan, 272
Mass. 207, 172 N.E. 74 (1930); Baber v. Caples, 71 Ore. 212, 138 Pac. 472 (1914).
9 Gledhill v. McCoombs, 110 Me. 341, 86 Atd. 247 (1913). The court held that a
person who claims property by parol gift is competent to testify in an action to
recover the property from the administrator of the deceased donor.
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uncorroborated, although undisputed, will it be sufficient to prove the
elements,10 or not."
In the present case, as a standard by which the facts should be judged,
the court established two criteria, 1. the rules of common law, and 2. the
public policy of the State of Indiana.' 2 The rules of common law,
adduced from the case of Devol v. Dye, 8 are not substantially different
from those of the cases noted,'1 4 but the introduction of public policy as
a consideration, materially alters the concept that the common law enter-
tained of the necessary proof.
The court conceded that at common law, no specific number of wit-
nesses is required.15 However, it made the assumption that delivery must
be accompanied by clear and convincing evidence, and the claimant has
the burden of proof, which is heavier than in the case of a gift inter vivos.
Though there is no difficulty in finding authority to sustain that view,16
authority to the contrary is as easily found. For instance, it has been
held that the claimant has established a prima facie case when he shows
that all the requisites prescribed are present;17 and that he need not
negative matters of defense;' 8 that only the quantum of evidence re-
quired in other civil cases is needed;19 that just a fair preponderance is
required;20 that where no fraud or undue influence has been alleged,
only slight evidence is needed. 21
The view advanced by Professor Phillip Mechem that delivery gives
the donee prima facie evidence in favor of an alleged parol gift,22 if
coupled with a test which seeks to determine whether or not the alleged
10E.g., In re Sherman, 227 N.Y. 350, 125 N.E. 546 (1919).
lQuarles v. Fowlkes, 147 Va. 493, 137 S.E. 365 (1927); cf. Gambill v. Hogan,
30 Tenn. App. 465, 207 S.W. 2d 356 (1947) wherein is found a suggestion of the
reasoning employed by the court in the Collinson case. Public policy is presumed
to be against permitting uncorroborated testimony regarding the promise of a de-
ceased promisor.
12 In re Collinson's Estate, 108 N.E. 2d 700 (Ind., 1952).
18 123 Ind. 321, 24 N.E. 246 (1890).
14 Authorities cited notes 2 and 3 supra.
1538 C.J.S. S 118b, p. 9 2 3 (1943).
'SApache State Bank v. Daniels, 32 Okla. 121, 121 Pac. 237 (1911); Hatch v.
Atkinson, 56 Me. 324 (1868).
1"In re Sherman, 227 N.Y. 350, 125 N.E. 546 (1919); In re Collinson's Estate,
108 N.E. 700 (Ind., 1952) dissenting opinion of Emmert, J.; 38 C.J.S. § 116b, p. 919
(1943).
Is 38 C.J.S. S 116b, p. 9 19 (1943).
19 Baber v. Caples, 71 Ore. 212, 138 Pac. 472 (1914).
201n re Williams, 278 N.Y. 538, 16 N.E. 2d 94 (1938).
21 McBride v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co., 330 Mo. 259, 48 S.W.
2d 922 (1932).
22 Mechem, Delivery in Gifts of Chattels, 21 Ill. T.. Rev. 341 (1946).
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donee had the opportunity to acquire possession in a manner inconsistent
with a gift 2 3 might operate to resolve this conflict. It can readily be
seen that no prima facie evidence ought to be inferred in favor of the
alleged donee in possession where he was the agent of,2 4 or in a con-
fidential relation to2 5 the alleged donor, or where fraud, or undue in-
fluence is alleged. 2' But where there was no opportunity for the alleged
donee to obtain possession in a manner other than that consistent with
the delivery of a gift, and the claimant has the alleged gift in his posses-
sion, only slight additional evidence, in the absence of contrary allega-
tions, ought to be sufficient to establish delivery, as a matter of law.
Two Illinois cases have been decided on just such principles. In Chi-
cago Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Cohn,27 the court refused to up-
hold the alleged gift because the wife of the alleged donee had access
to the room of the alleged donor whose physical state prevented speech.
In Simpson v. Heberlein28 the gift causa mortis of an unindorsed promis-
sory note was upheld on the uncorroborated testimony of the donee
who had no opportunity to acquire possession in a manner inconsistent
with a gift.
The court, in the Collinson case, found that gifts causa mortis are not
especially favored in law; but failed to note that neither are they op-
posed.2 9 Although the court found that such gifts are not contrary to
public policy,30 it went to the statutes concerning testamentary grants
to determine what the public policy was. The statutes provided, inter
alia, that a will must be attested by two or more competent witnesses,31
and that an unwritten will must be proved by two competent witnesses.32
It might be pointed out in this connection, that since the legislature
found it necessary to change the common law regarding wills, and did
not find it necessary to change the common law regarding gifts causa
mortis, it would seem that it intended the common law to remain un-
23 Salmon v. McCrary, 71 Ga. App. 262, 30 S.E. 2d 444 (1944). See, for an analysis
of what is considered an opportunity for acquiring such possession, Hecht v.
Shaf.er, 15 Wyo. 34, 85 Pac. 1056 (1906).
24 Beebee v. Peterson, 285 Pac. 616 (Kan., 1930).
25 Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J. 447, 59 Ad. 466 (1904).
20E.g., Whitmire v. Kroelinger, 42 F. 2d 699 (W.D.S.C., 1930), containing an
excellent and entertaining exposition of undue influence-its psychological and
philosophic bases.
27 197 Ill. App. 326 (1916).
28 259 IMl. App. 579 (1931).
2 9 Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N.Y. 572, 26 N.E. 627 (1891).
30 Caylor v. Caylor's Estate, 22 Ind. App. 666, 52 N.E. 465 (1899).
81XBurns Ind. Star., Tit. 7, S 201, p. 256 (1933).
3 2 Burns Ind. Stat., Tit. 7, § 202, p. 258 (1933).
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disturbed, and that this was public policy, as indeed, other courts have
done.38
Of course, if one holds that it is against public policy to allow parol
gifts causa mortis to be established on the sole, uncorroborated testimony
of the donee, the Collinson case may be decided on that one fact, making
further discussion academic. However, if the conclusion is that such
gifts may be so established, it follows that the alleged donee may testify
in his own behalf, although in some jurisdictions, statutes prohibit such
testimony. As pointed out by Emmert, J. in a vigorous dissent,84 the
modern tendency has not been to extend the class of incompetent wit-
nesses beyond the clear provisions of the statutes. 5
Further, the dissent argued, that if the alleged donee may testify, and
that testimony is unimpeached and uncontradicted in any material matter,
and every circumstance and reasonable inference both from her conduct
and testimony corroborated her evidence as to the gift, a trial court,
as a matter of law, may not disregard it.s8
Thus, we are led to the crux of the conflict. It is a conflict that
transcends the law of gifts causa mortis, and may fairly be said to be
one of the continuing, and most perplexing problems of our legal system:
how far should a court go in varying the common law which derived
great force from custom in regard to observance?
Since our legal system permits the legislative will of the people to
be manifest, it would seem that courts ought to be chary of inferring
that a change in one facet of the previous law by legislative enactment,
gives sanction to a court to change another via judicial fiat.
TAXATION-CONTEST PRIZES HELD TAXABLE
A philanthropist established a contest in 1945 wherein he offered
$25,000 for the best symphony written by an American composer. The
winning symphony was to remain the property of the composer sub-
ject to certain conditions.' The appellant, hereinafter referred to as
the taxpayer, a musician, composer, and college professor by profes-
sion, had composed a symphony during the years 1937, 1938, and 1939.
33 McKeon v. Van Slyck, 233 N.Y. 392, 119 N.E. 851 (1918). The court concluded
that corroboration is not essential as a matter of law and it is error to instruct the
jury otherwise.
34 In re Collinson's Estate, 108 N.E. 2d 700 (Ind., 1952).
35 2 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 578, 578a (3rd ed., 1940).
36 In re Collinson's Estate, 108 N.E. 2d 700, 707 (Ind., 1952).
1 The conditions were in part that the Detroit Orchestra, Inc., a nonprofit organ-
ization, shall have all synchronization rights as to motion pictures and all mechanical
rights as to phonograph recordings, electric transcriptions, and music rolls; ex-
clusive right to authorize the first performance of the composition; right to desig-
nate the publisher; right to give a broadcast performance within one year.
